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ABSTRACT: This article advises Army leaders to return to previously
successful strategies of influence to articulate a collaborative vision
for the future of air mobility. By underscoring the requirement for
multiservice capabilities to deliver personnel and matériel wherever
they are needed, US air mobility can once again become a strategic
force multiplier.

T

he capability of transporting matériel and personnel remains
essential to the US Army’s effectiveness.1 Likewise, maneuver
momentum—mass x speed—remains a relevant element of
national defense as Army operators and defense planners make the
necessary provisions to get land forces where they need to go, when they
need to go there, and with the necessary momentum. Accordingly, this
article addresses two questions regarding American air-mobility forces.
First, can the present and future US Air Force airlift force structure
support existing and emerging US Army movement and maneuver
requirements? Second, should the Army address its mobility concerns
passively, by declaring its requirements and hoping the Air Force will
come up with appropriate forces, or assertively, by involving itself more
deeply in all details of airlift force structure planning? The importance
of these two questions is obvious given the integral role of inter- and
intratheater air mobility in most Army warfighting concepts. Ultimately,
the Army’s vision of itself as a global response force, able to conduct
rapid and agile “expeditionary maneuver” over strategic and theater
distances, is compromised by shortfalls in our nation’s airlift program;
but the Army can do something about that vulnerability.2

The Army and Airlift Relevance

An airlift planning adage states “the Army does not have light units;
it has heavy and incredibly heavy units.” This adage will remain painfully
relevant to the current global environment of burgeoning strategic
complexity, insufficient budgets, continuous (and probably expanding)
overseas commitments, a predominantly homeland-based force
structure, and “diverse enemies employing traditional, unconventional,
and hybrid strategies.”3 Enemies such as international criminal gangs,
1      US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), The U.S. Army Functional Concept
for Movement and Maneuver, 2020–2040, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-6 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC,
2017), 34.
2      For the Army’s emerging vision, see TRADOC, The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a
Complex World, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, October 14, 2014), 18; and
General Mark A. Milley, “Developing the Future Force, Part 2,” interview by Jen Judson, Defense
News, October 6, 2016.
3      TRADOC, Operating Concept, 8–14.
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transnational terrorists, and insurgents are growing stronger. Some are
approaching the point of near-peer status in local areas and in certain
realms of combat, gaining a capacity for coordinated or concurrent
attacks on the United States and its interests. Nuclear proliferation and
inexpensive communication networks also increase the possible danger,
velocity, and complexity of future crises and conflicts.4
In response, Army leaders and planners are exploring numerous
doctrine, training, force structure, and equipment innovations to
preserve future readiness. The recently released Army movement and
maneuver concept, for example, calls for task-organized forces moving
in unpredictable ways and maneuvering throughout the depth of future
battlefields to “defeat enemies by forcing them to fight against multiple
types of attacks from multiple directions and domains.”5 To survive and
fight decisively, these task-organized forces will need to be capable of
semi-independent—but mutually supporting—cross-domain land, sea,
air, space and cyber operations for at least one week before pausing to rest
and refit.6 In many circumstances, these operations will enable sea and
air forces to achieve their missions and support in-theater preparation
activities by Joint commands. Agile strategic maneuver and logistical
support by air and sea will be essential to achieving these effects.7
The success of these emerging lines of development will depend on
the support of robust air mobility. Future combat scenarios often will
require the Army to “maneuver over strategic distances along multiple
axes of advance by air and sea,” without stopping at intermediate staging
bases.8 If enemy anti-access/area denial operations block the arrival of
sea and air forces in the early phases of future campaigns, Army forcible
entry operations likely will involve airlifts of assault and then follow-on
forces to seize terrain in unpredictable locations and to transition quickly
to offensive operations. Throughout these activities, Army commanders
will require high-capacity airlifts to build up and sustain maneuvers,
achieve missions, evade enemy fires, reduce logistical footprints, and
facilitate mutual support among widely dispersed units.9
The Army’s dependence on airlift gives it a practically bottomless
quantitative appetite for airlift support. Moving a single Stryker brigade
combat team, for example, involves around 4,200 personnel as well
as 15,000 tons of matériel and sustainment, taking about 380 C-17

4      Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster, “Harbingers of Future War: Implications for the Army”
(presentation, Military Strategy Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 4, 2016);
and Milley, “Developing the Future Force.”
5      TRADOC, Functional Concept, 15,
6      Ibid., 13–15, 25.
7      Eric Lindsey, Beyond Coast Artillery: Cross-Domain Denial and the Army (Washington, DC: Center
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2014), 1–6; Milley, “Developing the Future Force”; and
William G. Braun III and David Lai, U.S.-China Competition: Asia-Pacific Land Force Implications (Carlisle,
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2016), 66–68.
8      DoD, Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) (Washington, DC: DoD, 2012), 34
9      For the Army’s vision of the relationship between maneuver and air and sea mobility, see
US Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) and US Marine Corps Combat Development
Command (CDC), Gaining and Maintaining Access: An Army-Marine Corps Concept (Fort Eustis, VA:
ARCIC / CDC, 2012), 7–13. For the Air Force’s tentative view of the aircraft needed to support
Army maneuver, see Air Mobility Command (AMC), Joint Future Theater Lift: Technology Study Final
Report (Scott Air Force Base [AFB], IL: AMC, 2013), 16–18.
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Globemaster sorties.10 Assuming an out-and-back cycle time of 36
hours and a continual commitment of 40 C-17s, or approximately 20
percent of the US fleet, deploying the brigade from the middle of the
continental United States to the Baltic Sea region would take about 14
days. Adding more C-17s and C-5 Galaxies might accelerate the move,
but only if adequate airfields and parking spaces are available at the
delivery points.11 Simple multiplication illustrates the timelines involved
in air movements of multibrigade forces, their supporting elements, and
sustainment supplies over longer distances can stretch into months.
Even if equipment arrives by sea, onward movements to their points of
need often will consume substantial theater airlift efforts to spare forces
long, dangerous, and tactically undesirable road marches.
The Army also has articulated challenging qualitative requirements
for airlift support under austere conditions. Indeed, in the face of strong
enemy anti-access/area denial capabilities, Army air movements and
maneuvers are far more likely to terminate at austere airfields and unpaved
landing grounds than at developed airports and bases with long runways
and extensive but easily identified and targeted parking areas. At the
extreme of its maneuver vision, the Army’s mounted vertical maneuver
concept calls for “the maneuver and vertical insertion of medium-weight
armored forces into areas in close proximity to their battlefield objectives
without the need for fixed airports, airfields or prepared airheads.”12 Similarly, the
current US Army operating concept links the availability of Air Force
airlift assets and improvements in Army rotary-wing transports to its
“maneuver advantage . . . to overcome challenges of restrictive terrain
and operations across long distances . . . to deter adversaries; respond
rapidly to crises; and conduct expeditionary maneuver.”13 Succinctly, the
Army wants airlift support capable not only of delivering all types of
combat units and their matériel into the widest possible range of tactical
destinations but also for maintaining delivery densities necessary to
dominate any point in their battlespaces.
Delivery density, an uncommon term, is a useful consideration in
evaluations of airlift aircraft and force structures. To maintain tactical
dominance in circumstances characterized by fast-breaking events and
waiting enemies, deployment times of these movements—measured
from the first aircraft’s “wheels-up” to the arrival of the last aircraft—
must be narrow enough to get ready-to-fight units on the ground and
reinforced with light- to medium- mobile protected firepower elements
before enemies can react. Consequently, the term has its most acute
relevance to land forces transitioning across domain boundaries such
as airland or airborne assaults. Under such circumstances, the interval
between the arrival of the first and last aircraft to the battlespace must
be short, or dense, enough to allow units to maintain tactical dominance
even as they organize for offensive operations. For airlift planners,
10      Deployment Process Modernization Office, TRADOC, Fort Eustis, Virginia, e-mail message
to author, February 27, 2013; and in Alan Vick, David Orletsky, Bruce Pirnie, and Seth Jones, The
Stryker Brigade Combat Team: Rethinking Strategic Responsiveness and Assessing Deployment Options (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002), 15–17.
11      Vick, Orletsky, Pirnie, and Jones, Stryker, 13–29.
12      Brigadier General Robin P. Swan and Lieutenant Colonel Scott R. McMichael, “Mounted
Vertical Maneuver: A Giant Leap Forward in Maneuver and Sustainment,” Military Review 87, no. 1
(January–February 2007): 52–62; emphasis added.
13      TRADOC, Operating Concept, 15, 17, and 22.
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then, achieving tactically viable delivery densities mandates acquiring
and operating the airlift force necessary to get soldiers, equipment, and
sustainment on the ground as quickly as possible and in increments
configured for immediate and effective combat. Delivery density does
not imply forces must arrive instantaneously—though helicopter assaults
of infantry can approach that ideal—but forces must arrive fast enough
to establish and preserve tactical dominance.
The ability of airlift forces and their aircraft to achieve dense
airland deliveries of ground forces is directly related to their terminal
agility—the variety of runways and terminal infrastructures into which
they can operate. Airlift forces dependent upon the long and paved
runways and parking areas of global and regional airports are far less
likely to get Army forces to their points of need than airlift forces that
can use short and unpaved airstrips, sections of multilane highways,
open fields, or (best of all) helicopter landing zones.14 A study by the
Army Capabilities Integration Center provides a useful example of these
considerations. Examining the airfield availability to support force flows
into a large African country, the study found the number of locations
available to vertical takeoff and landing aircraft was virtually limitless.
In comparison, only 24 percent of the territory lay within 50 kilometers
of airfields capable of receiving a C-130 Hercules or a C-17 needed to
deliver Stryker units. Moreover, the country possessed only 13 airfields
able to accommodate C-5s.15 Only a few of those airports possessed the
maximum-on-ground aircraft parking capacity to receive large airlift
flows or to serve as global-theater intermediate staging bases. This issue
is critical since airfield limitations or available transportation personnel
will impose maximum on-ground limitations that will consequently
limit throughput at forward airfields regardless of the number of aircraft
available.16 Indeed, one recent Air Force review estimated only 16
airfields surveyed in sub-Saharan Africa had the runways and capacities
needed to serve as C-17 hubs for onward C-130 operations.17

Shortfalls in the Airlift Program of Record

A complex relationship exists between the Army’s airlift support
requirements and the current airlift program of record’s ability to satisfy
them. The American national air-mobility system is unparalleled in its
capacity and personnel expertise.18 But, its ability to deliver combat
forces to the places and with the delivery densities the Army wants is

14      For discussion on the operational and aerodynamic characteristics of these different airfield
profiles, see Robert C. Owen, “Theater Airlift Modernization: Options for Closing the Gap,” Joint
Force Quarterly 75 (4th Quarter 2014): 17.
15      Jim Young, “A Strategic Terrain Analysis Examining Deployment Considerations within the
Arc of Instability” (briefing, US Army Capabilities Integration Center Deployment Modernization
Office, February 4, 2009), slides 13 and 14.
16      Importantly, the Air Mobility Command’s 621st Contingency Response Wing only fields a
handful of mobile transportation elements, which are able to support two aircraft on the ground
at expeditionary airfields. Vick, Orletsky, Pirnie, and Jones, Stryker, 47; Christopher G. Pernin et
al., Enabling the Global Response Force: Access Strategies for the 82nd Airborne Division (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 2016), 22, 30–31, 40; and Robert C. Owen, “Humanitarian Relief in Haiti,
2010: Honing the Partnership between the US Air Force and the UN,” in Air Power in UN Operations:
Wings for Peace, ed. A. Walter Dorn (Farnham, Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2014), 90.
17      Christopher M. Jones, e-mail message to author, December 29, 2015. At the time, Captain
Jones was an operations research scientist at the combined headquarters of United States Air Forces
Europe (USAFE)—Air Forces Africa, USAFE A9/A9A.
18      For a general history of the development of American air-mobility capabilities, see Robert C.
Owen, Air Mobility: A Brief History of the American Experience (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2013).
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demonstrably inadequate. Moreover, the Department of Defense (DoD)
has no comprehensive plan in place to address these shortfalls any time
soon despite spending funds on piecemeal modernization programs that
will not meet the full scope of the Army’s future needs much more than
do the current requirements.
The American air-mobility system consists of several interconnected
components. Its total force military arm consists of operationally
integrated Air Force, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard
components that possess a core airlift fleet of 54 C-5s, 222 C-17s, and
over 300 C-130s. These components also operate just over a hundred
specialized transports, ranging from presidential Boeing 747s to small
business jets.19 Additionally, some 20 air carriers contribute around 450
airliners to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet.20 The rest of the airlift enterprise
consists of a global system created by commands, headquarters, operating
bases, logistics elements within each service, depots, and supply centers
as well as training, education, and professional organizations.21 In a
maximum effort, the Air Force expects this mobility system to produce
around 50 million ton-miles per day (MTM/D) of lift. For perspective,
this much cargo equates to transporting 4,600 tons per day over 11,000
nautical miles (nm)—a roundtrip between Joint Base Lewis-McChord,
Washington and the Philippine island of Luzon—perhaps the equivalent
of a brigade delivery every 4 days.
Of course, the ideal airlift would only exist if “someone shows up
with enough fairy dust to wish away all of the things that hinder airlift
efforts.”22 Historically, hindrances include competing demands on fleet
capacity, changes in local operational circumstances and priorities,
enemy and enemy-sympathizer military and diplomatic actions, limited
availability of suitable enroute and destination airfields, breakdowns
in movement coordination and cargo tracking, crew force limitations,
shortages of cargo pallets and aircraft loading equipment, aircraft
maintenance challenges, and more. During the Persian Gulf War, these
impediments limited the airlift throughput to 13.6 MTM/D out of a
notional airlift system capacity of about 49 MTM/D.23 The military
services have done much to improve airlift management since then, but
the complexities of and competition for airlift support have increased. In
other words, the system will work better in the future but probably not
enough to justify confident expectations that it will perform at capacity.
The mismatch in the cargo compartment sizes and the capacities of
aircraft in the core airlift fleet also undermines the efficiency of many
airlift operations. The airlift fleet has two categories of aircraft based
19      Brendan McGarry, “USAF Almanac: Equipment,” Air Force Magazine 99, no. 5 (May 2016):
32–33. The number of C-130s in the fleet is variable at the moment, as the Air Force is slowly
reducing the size of the fleet towards about 300 aircraft.
20      Michael Lowder to Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Program Participants, memorandum,
“Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Allocation Changes—2016,” January 20, 2016, US Department of
Transportation, Washington, DC, 1 and enclosure 1. For a comprehensive discussion of the workings of the CRAF, see USTRANSCOM and AMC, Civil Reserve Air Fleet Study, Phase 2 Report (Scott
AFB, IL: USTRANSCOM / AMC, 2014).
21      For a detailed discussion on the national air mobility system, see Air University, Air Mobility
Operations, Annex 3-17 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Lemay Center for Doctrine, 2014).
22      Major General Timothy Zadalis (comments, Air Mobility and the Future of Air and Land
Warfare panel, 2016 Airlift/Tanker Association Conference, Nashville, TN, October 29, 2016).
23      Military Airlift Command, History of Military Airlift Command, Calendar Year 1991, vol. 1,
Narrative and Appendices (Scott AFB, IL: Air Mobility Command History Office), 175.
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on cargo compartment size. C-5s and C-17s comprise a category of
big airplanes capable of carrying outsized loads such as battle tanks,
self-propelled artillery, and up-armored M1126 Stryker infantry carriers
between developed airfields. The second category includes C-130s, much
smaller aircraft capable of operating on unpaved airstrips while carrying
medium-weight and oversized loads such as early variant, lightly armored
Strykers, towed artillery, medium-weight engineering equipment, and
tactical radars. The cargo compartment mismatch separating these two
transport categories chokes force movements at intermediate staging
bases when cargoes are transferred from the big planes to the C-130s
capable of landing at less developed airfields closer to points of need.
This disconnect can impose painful operational choices on commanders
trying to preserve unit integrity while moving to austere forward bases.
The limited range and payload characteristics of the current theater
transport fleet exacerbates the operational dilemmas inherent in force
deployments since they can force commanders to conduct intermediate
staging base operations within range of enemy weapons. A C-130J
carrying a 38,000-pound basic Stryker vehicle, for example, has a
range of about 1,600 nm. In comparison, the Airbus A400M can carry
the same vehicle for 3,700 nm; the developmental Embraer KC-390
tanker-transport aircraft for 2,100 nm.24 Considering that unrefueled
operational radius is around 40 percent of an aircraft’s range, an
intermediate staging base receiving C-130J support for a Stryker brigade
move would have to be within 640 nm of its point of need. That distance
is well within the range of tactical aircraft armed with standoff weapons
and by medium-range ballistic missiles, such as the Chinese DF-21. In
such situations, Army movements affected by the previously mentioned
chokepoints would be more vulnerable to enemy attacks.
The defense community has been fully aware of these long-standing
mobility shortfalls as expressed in a US Transportation Command
report in 2011:
Future operations described in joint concepts require the ability to transport
forces over strategic and operational distances directly to points of need and
to routinely operate on austere, short, and unimproved landing areas. The
current mobility airlift fleet cannot. C-130s can carry cargo to semi-prepared
runways, but not the medium-weight forces needed. C-17s and C-5s, on the
other hand, can carry the medium-weight force, but not directly to a short
or soft landing area that may be the point of need.25

More recently, US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)
Commander General Darren W. McDew reported to Congress: “The
current pace of today’s operations requires the full effort of our . . . fleet.
Should the need arise to respond elsewhere in the world, the mobility
resources required could exceed our existing capacity.”26 McDew
expressed the fleet’s capacity would be “sufficient with a manageable
amount of risk.”27 Whatever “manageable” meant in this context, the term
24      Robert C. Owen, Shaping Air Mobility Forces for Future Relevance (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force
Research Institute, 2017), appendix.
25      USTRANSCOM, Future Deployment and Distribution Assessment: Mobility Lift Platforms, Final
Report, vol. 1 (Scott AFB, IL: USTRANSCOM, 2011), 2–11.
26      Hearing on the U.S. Transportation Command 2017 Readiness Posture, 114th Cong. (2016) (statement
of General Darren W. McDew, commander, USTRANSCOM), 6:50.
27      Ibid., 37:57.

Army Expansibility

Owen

109

implicitly reinforces the perception that the simultaneous, multithreat,
and multiregion crises visualized by current Army commanders—and
the entire defense community—could quickly overwhelm American
air-mobility capabilities, forcing difficult operational decisions within
combatant commands.
Despite the obvious shortfalls and operational limitations of the
existing airlift fleet, planning in this area by the Defense Department
and the Air Force proceeds at a glacial pace. The Mobility Capabilities
and Requirements Study-2016 (MCRS-16) and related strategic guidance
documents remain the authoritative baselines for DoD discussions
of airlift force structure issues. MCRS-16 found the existing airlift
force sufficient to meet current DoD conflict planning scenarios
but recommended the Department of Defense “continue to explore
strategies to mitigate the adverse impacts of infrastructure constraints”
to support major force deployments.28 Oddly, the report also implied
the availability of C-17s to support intratheater movements reduced
the requirements for C-130s even though the bigger aircraft is more
infrastructure-dependent than the smaller one.29 The Government
Accountability Office subsequently questioned the usefulness and
even the relevance of MCRS-16 since the study provided no specific
risk assessments of identified shortfalls and the basic DoD planning
guidelines had changed since its publication.30 Since then, various
DoD and Air Force organizations have conducted limited studies of
technology and fleet mix issues, but the Defense Department will not
update MCRS until 2018, presumably after the Trump administration
has issued new strategic guidance. So, apart from vague pronouncements
about possibly recapitalizing the strategic airlift fleet in the 2030s and
the theater fleet a decade or so thereafter, the defense community has no
comprehensive plan to address the qualitative and quantitative shortfalls
in the airlift fleet.

The Army’s Essential Role in Past Airlift Force Modernizations

If the past can be a prologue, it is important to understand no
major modernization of American airlift forces has ever happened
in the absence of strong, public, institutional, and detailed leadership
from the Army. Certainly, Army leadership was pivotal to such policy
milestones as the creation of the battlefield airlift component of Army
aviation and global airlift forces as well as the acquisition of the C-17.
Faced with Air Force reluctance in the mid-1950s to acquire fixed- and
rotary-wing airlift forces adequate for their vision of maneuver on
nuclear battlefields, Army leaders bootlegged their own technical and
tactical development program, successfully pressing for funding to buy
thousands of helicopters and a small fixed-wing fleet.31 Concurrent Army
28      William J. Lynn III, deputy secretary of defense, memorandum, “Mobility Capabilities and
Requirements Study—16 Executive Summary,” February 26, 2010, US Department of Defense,
Washington, DC, 4.
29      Ibid., 4–5.
30      US Government Accountability Office (GAO), Defense Transportation: Additional Information
Is Needed for DOD’s Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 to Fully Address All of Its Study
Objectives, Report 11-82R (Washington, DC: GAO, 2010), 3, 6–7.
31      Christopher C. S. Cheng, Air Mobility: The Development of a Doctrine (Westport, CT: Praeger,
1994), 85–111; and James W. Williams, A History of Army Aviation: From Its Beginnings to the War on
Terror (New York: iUniverse, 2005), 69–80.
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advocacy for true global mobility and the “politicking” of sympathetic
Air Force enthusiasts, two presidents, and many engaged legislators
obliged the Air Force to fund the development of a turbofan-powered
transport fleet truly capable of lifting all types of ground units over
the oceans.32 As America’s strategic circumstances changed and the
end-of-service life for the original turbofan fleet loomed, strong and
persistent advocacy by Army leaders, overseas commanders in chief,
and interested congressmen helped Air Force mobility leaders keep the
replacement program focused on the uniquely capable C-17.33 Without
that advocacy, the program’s focus might have drifted to cheaper options,
such as upgraded C-5s and slightly modified commercial designs, less
compatible with the Army’s emerging mobility needs. Conversely, the
Army’s recent failure to package its proposed Joint Heavy Lift and Joint
Cargo Aircraft programs to bridge interservice doctrines, roles, budgets,
and professional languages led to the collapse of both programs.34
The US Army’s advocacy for these programs had several consistent
features. Most important, leaders did not cross the boundary between
aggressive advocacy and insubordination.35 Rather, they worked within
legal and constitutional structures to influence national policy and the
Defense Department’s military requirements processes. They and their
sympathizers surely stepped on institutional toes, but nothing suggests
laws were broken or the good order and discipline of American defense
services was undermined. Also, the Army galvanized every critical airlift
debate with clear, confident, and credible vision documents. These
documents ranged from the 1954 Project Vista study that coalesced Army
thinking about air mobility in nuclear warfare to the Objective Force
concept of the early 2000s that reaffirmed and quantified the Army’s
need for long-range global mobility.36 Last, Army leaders approached
advocacy as a team effort, assiduously informing and cooperating with
other services, government leaders, and civil authorities on its airlift
needs. Ultimately, this broad-based support carried visions of airlift
modernization to the national level of endorsement and funding.
Current circumstances indicate requirements for successful advocacy
of Army airlift interests will not change significantly. Conflicting
perspectives dominate the complex and costly realm of military affairs.
Army leaders view airlift as a vital underpinning of their mission and
relevance; Air Force leaders consider Army movement aspirations as
elements of a broader set of operational obligations and budgetary
demands. Neither side clearly understands the tactical requirements of
the other. Corporate leaders not only love their country but also market
specific aircraft. Congressional members worry about national defense
while protecting their Air National Guard units and preserving the
32      Robert C. Owen, Air Mobility, 139–55.
33      Owen, Air Mobility, 229–39. For a definitive discussion of this project and its advocacy, see
Betty R. Kennedy, Globemaster III: Acquiring the C-17 (Scott AFB, IL: Air Mobility Command, Office
of History, 2004).
34      Owen, Air Mobility, 291–94.
35      For more than this summary of the content and tone of Army airlift advocacy based on
numerous sources, see “Army Aviation in the 1950s” and “Vietnam—The Air Mobility War” in
Owen, Air Mobility. Also see Williams, History of Army Aviation, 66–77, 97–104, 407–14. For a useful
case study into the Army’s development and advocacy of the air mobility concept, see John J. Tolson
in Air Mobility 1961–1971 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1973), 1–22.
36      California Institute of Technology, Final Report on Project VISTA: A Study of Ground and Air
Tactical Warfare with Especial Reference to the Defense of Western Europe, series A, vol. 1 (February 4, 1952).
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economic well-being of their constituents. The intellectually stagnating
effect of strategic uncertainty accompanying the increasing complexity
of the military’s future overshadows each of these interests.
So, if the Army intends to shape an air-mobility fleet capable of
supporting battle through the remainder of the century, it had better get
engaged. As General Mark Milley said on the eve of becoming the Army
chief of staff, it is time for him and the other service chiefs to “elbow” their
way into more assertive participation in Joint modernization decisions.37

Shaping the Future Airlift Program for Warfighting Relevance

Assiduous long-term airlift policy requires sustained knowledge
acquisition and context-setting campaigns by the appropriate Army
commands and leaders. The Army must clearly articulate its key airlift
goals and ardently hold the Air Force to its responsibilities to maintain
capability requirements. The first goal might address transporting
forces and outsize cargoes from intermediate staging bases located
outside enemy weapon-engagement zones to dispersed and austere
points of need. Some solutions Army leaders might champion include
equipping the Army with improved medium-weight protected firepower
vehicles and advancing vertical takeoff and landing technology. Should
advancing vertical technology prove unattainable or unaffordable, supershort takeoff and landing systems capable of lifting medium-weight
forces might be a practical alternative. Due to the extreme MTM/D
requirements, profoundly increasing the throughputs and delivery
densities of long-range airlift forces into global class and regional
airfields cannot be overlooked.
Army leaders should broker an agreement between their service, the
Air Force, and other willing stakeholders, particularly the combatant
commands, to identify the appropriate technologies and to develop
acquisition strategies for modernizing air-mobility forces to meet specific
operational requirements rather than simple gross-lift calculations. This
step is essential to shaping the focus of the forthcoming MCRS and
to initiating modernization and development programs quickly—for
example, if all agree filling the existing gap in delivering medium-weight,
oversize loads to austere airfields is a pressing need, incrementing a fleet
of A400Ms for operations over the next 30 years can begin shortly after
the MCRS. Likewise, if emphasis is given to the strategic throughput
problem, development of a new strategic airlifter, probably larger than
the C-5 but with better airfield agility, can start. One compelling reason
for expediting these assessments is maximizing opportunities to offset
some costs by terminating acquisitions and service-life extensions of less
useful systems.
Finally, the Army should encourage stakeholders to create a new
multiservice airlift knowledge-management organization similar in
concept and tasking to the Airlift Concepts and Requirements Agency,
established in 1984 to “coordinate and integrate . . . the development and
promulgation of joint airlift concepts, doctrine, training, procedures,
and materiel which support current and future Air Force and Army
37      Marcus Weisgerber, “US Army’s New Chief Sets Three Goals,” Defense One, October 8,
2015.
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doctrine and unified and specified command requirements.”38 Given
changes in the Joint system since then, the structure of a new airlift
knowledge management organization will likely differ in many respects
from the Airlift Concepts and Requirements Agency, but the defense
community will benefit from the centralization. Such an organization
can facilitate the efforts of many groups to arrive at a common, detailed,
and comprehensive understanding of airlift useful for wisely building
the most capable fleet.

38      Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force, MAC-TRADOC Airlift Concepts
and Requirements Agency (ACRA) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army and Department of
the Air Force, 1985), 1.

